Standard epistemic logic studies propositional knowledge, yet many other types of knowledge such as "knowing whether", "knowing what", and "knowing how" are frequently and widely used in everyday life as well as academic fields. An axiomatization of the epistemic logic with both regular "knowing that" operator and "conditionally knowing what" operator is recently given in [Yanjing Wang and Jie Fan. Conditionally knowing what. in Proceedings of AiML14, April 2014.]. Then the decidability and complexity of this logic command our study. In this paper, we give an axiomatization and a tableau for the modal logic with the same operators on arbitrary Kripke models. Given the tableau, the complexity of the satisfiability problem of this logic is PSPACE-complete.
Introduction
Standard epistemic logic studies the "knowing that" operator K i where K i φ means agent i knows that φ is true. While this perspective fixed our focus on propositional knowledge, its simplicity also facilitated the studies, extensions, and applications of it. Recent decades witnessed the prosperity of numerous logics with standard knowing-that operator or similar propositional operators in fields like philosophy, computer science, and game theory. However, there are also other interesting knowledge expressions used in our everyday life, like "knowing whether", "knowing what", and "knowing how", which have raised many interesting questions in linguistics and philosophy, but received less attention in logic.
Among these ways of expressing knowledge, "knowing what" is particularly suitable for the beginning of our logical study of the myriad of non-standard knowledge operators, for it is a richer topic compared to "knowing whether", less contentious than "knowing how" philosophically, interesting in its own logical and mathematical properties, and readily applicable in other fields like cryptography. For example, sentences like "he knows that she knows her private key, but he do not know what exactly his private key is." are typical in security settings. With the propositional knowledge operator K alone, we may have a formula K i K j p ∧ ¬K i p to express this. But by axiom T in standard epistemic logic, this formula is not consistent. Introducing something new is obviously needed, and several attempts was made recently, such as [3, 8] in security settings.
In fact, in his grounding work of the epistemic logic [4] , Hintikka has already briefly discussed "knowing who" in ch.6.3, an operator with evident similarity with "knowing what", in terms of first-order modal logic. In [7] , a seminal work that is hitherto mostly referred to by the studies of Public Announcement Logic, Plaza also proposed a "knowing what" operator K v, of course in the context of Public Announcement Logic. This leaves us a logic with both "knowing what" and public announcement.
Technically, K v operator packs an existential quantifier with a modality together, and the resulting logic is a small fragment of first-order modal logic, which requires new techniques to handle. To deal with the public announcement part, we need to change our perspective and pack announcement into the "knowing what" operator to make it a conditional one. Thus until in [11, 10] by Wang and Fan did we see a complete axiomatization of the logic with both the "knowing what" operator and the model relativization operator, i.e., ELKv r . Because of the potential application of this logic, such as in the field of computer science and AI as argued by McCarthy in [6] , the decidability and complexity of this logic become important. In [12] , Xiong has shown that ELKv r is decidable for its small model property. As for complexity, this paper serves as a preliminary step.
In this paper, we show that the axiomatization of Wang and Fan without the characteristic S5 axioms is also complete w.r.t. the logic on the class of arbitrary models (call it LKv r , that is, ELKv r without the initial "Epistemic"). We simplifies the proof of completeness in [11] significantly. With the constraint of reflexivity, there are some interactions between agents, thus the beautiful property of the conditional part of knowing what operator in one agent is obscured and complicated. Without such constraint, we can work on the knowledge of an agent more easily and abstractly.
Moreover, we show that the complexity of the satisfiability of the logic is PSPACE-complete, which is no more complex than most normal modal logics and in particular K. This is by way of a tableau. Normally a tableau means two things: first, to test the satisfiability of a formula, only its subformula counts, and thus we can do trials on each of those subformulas by setting it true or false; second, we have a canonical or minimal way to deal with the modal operators, much like the spirit of Sahlqvist's minimal assignment method, such that if this minimal way fails, all possible ways fail necessarily. As for our logic on the model class K, the first property is also true, and for the second property, there is not "a" canonical way but an array of them, enumerable within PSPACE.
The rest of this paper is structured as such: we first give the syntax and semantics of LKv r and its proof system r in section 2. Section 3 presents the completeness results and Section 4 the complexity. We then conclude this paper with future work in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We follow the notations proposed in [11] . However, since we are now working on arbitrary Kripke models, it is no longer appropriate to use K as the modal operator. So we now return to the box and diamond notation.
Given a countably infinite set of proposition letters P, a countably infinite set of agent names I, and a countably infinite set of (non-rigid) constant symbols D, the language of LKv r is defined as follows:
where p ∈ P, i ∈ I, and d ∈ D. Our new operator ∇ i (φ, d) here says that, in all possible cases where φ is true, the value of d is all the same. For example, the sentence "I know your password if it is a four-digit number" can be expressed as ∇(four-digit_number_password, password).
As usual, we define ⊥, (φ∨ψ), (φ → ψ), and ◊ i φ as the abbreviations of, respectively, ¬⊤, ¬(¬φ∧ ¬ψ), ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ), and ¬ i ¬φ. Parentheses will be omitted unless confusion arises.
For future convenience, write Sub(φ) for the set of subformulas of φ, where for ∇ i (φ, d), its subformulas are itself plus all the subformulas of φ. Then define Sub 
To interpret LKv r , we need to extend common Kripke models to incorporate the assignment of the names in D, and this can also be seen as a first-order Kripke model with a constant domain. So a model of LKv r is defined as
in which S is a non-empty set of possible worlds, O is a non-empty set of values, → i is a binary relation on S, V is a function assigning to each proposition letter p ∈ P a set of possible worlds V (p) ⊂ S where p is true, and V D a function from D×S to O so that each value name d ∈ D at each possible world s is assigned a value V D (d, s). Let K denote the class of all models defined above. Now the semantics: 
where x is a rigid variable and c a non-rigid one. Thus a ∇ is actually a package consists of a quantifier, a modality, an implication, and an equality.
As for the derivation system, it is enough to just exclude axioms particular to S5 from the system proposed in [11] :
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
Completeness
Our proof of the completeness of r proceeds in the standard Henkin way: use maximal consistent sets as the basis of the canonical model, link the canonical relations properly so that an existence lemma can be proven, use the existence lemma to prove a truth lemma and then completeness follows immediately. However, as our ∇ operator packs many things in it, simply a maximal consistent set does not give us enough information to pin down every possibilities. Thus, we need to saturate these maximal consistent sets consistently. Specifically, since • For s, t ∈ S c , s→ i t iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
Here, g is the counterpart of Given this canonical model, existence lemma is then our aim. In ordinary model logic, it is enough to use Lindenbaum lemma to extend Γ\ i to build a i−successor of Γ. However, as our canonical model requires more information, or a saturation, we must show that such a saturation is possible i.e. is consistent with what we already have. The following proposition states this technically:
Given a possible world s ∈ S c , an agent i ∈ I, a maximal consistent set Γ such that {φ | i φ ∈ s} ⊆ Γ and a natural number x ∈ , we can construct t = 〈Γ, f , g〉 using x such that t ∈ S c and s→ i t.
Proof. Note that the only thing we need to do is to construct appropriate f and g so that t = 〈Γ, f , g〉 satisfies the requirements (1), (2) and (4) stated in definition 1, since (3) is already satisfied. We first construct f (which is easier) and then g.
For any d ∈ D:
Obviously, if this f is well-defined, then (4) in definition 1 will be satisfied. Now we claim that this definition is indeed well-defined, that is, for any φ, ψ ∈ LKv r such that φ ∈ Γ,
Then ¬φ ∨ ¬ψ ∈ Γ. Again, since Γ is maximal, either ¬φ ∈ Γ or ¬ψ ∈ Γ. But either way, Γ will be inconsistent.
By axiom V∨ and the maximality of s,
) and this concludes the proof of the well-definedness of f .
The construction of g is more involved because of the clause (2). For any i ∈ I and any d ∈ D, first we construct a partition on the set
Note that this set is exactly the collection of formulas that we need to give a non-star value through g(i, φ, d), and the clause (2) is effective only on this set. For any two φ,
is an equivalence relation:
Transitivity This is more interesting.
Notice that we have following derivation:
Since Γ is a maximal consistent set w.r.t. r , this tells us that
It's now easy to see that this definition satisfies (1) and (2) of definition 1.
For future convenience, we call this construction as F, that is, F(s, Γ, a, x) = 〈Γ, f , g〉 where f and g are defined as above.
After the above proposition, we are now able to prove existence lemma. First is the existence lemma for ¬ i φ:
Lemma 3. For any s ∈ S c , any i ∈ I, any φ ∈ LKv r : ¬ i φ ∈ s implies that there is a world t ∈ S c such that s→ i t and ¬ψ ∈ t.
Proof. It is a standard modal logic exercise to show that X = {¬ψ}∪{φ | i φ ∈ s} is consistent. By Lindenbaum Lemma (for LKv r ), X can be extended into a MCS Γ. Then by proposition 2, Γ can again be extended into a possible world t = F(s, Γ, i, 0) ∈ S c such that s→ i t. Since ¬ψ ∈ X , ¬ψ ∈ t. Now we need to deal with formulas in the form of ¬∇ i (ψ, d 
Again we use the notation
Suppose it is not, then there is a finite subset B of A such that ⊢ B → ¬ψ. By NEC and
Now we prove (!) by two cases:
and we have the following:
By the construction method of F, this is immediate.
•
From the construction rule of f in proposition 2, we can see that these are true, by the fact that for all φ ∈ LKv r , either
). This means ¬φ ∈ Γ and by the consistency of Γ, φ ∈ Γ With the above facts, the (!) is obviously true now.
For convenience, name this formula δ 0
At this point, we need to split case 2 into two subcases, with the following proposition as the dividing line: 
The former means
) by the definition 1. Now since A ∪ {χ 1 } and A ∪ {χ 2 } are both consistent, let Γ 1 and Γ 2 be the MCSs extended by them respectively, and 
is true. Under this supposition, let χ 0 be the element in
) again for some finite subset A ′′ 0 of A. Note this long formula by δ 1 . Notice the following proof schema:
Using this schema, and the fact that ⊢ δ 0 , ⊢ δ 1 , we have the following proof:
Now we use a simple induction to show that
as λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . λ n and inductively define
Induction
Step For Λ k = Λ k−1 ∪ {λ k }, firstly, by the same kind of argument in induction basis,
So by the requirement (2) of a suitable possible canonical world in definition 1 imposed on s, Proof. The inductive proof of this is a common practice in modal logic. Here we only show the two non-trivial cases: 
By lemma 4 and IH, we have t 1 , t 2 ∈ S c such that
Based on this, we are able to present:
Theorem 6. r is sound and strongly complete for LKv r .
Proof. Soundness is rather simple. For any consistent set ∆ ⊆ LKv r , using Lindenbaum Lemma for LKv r , there exists a MCS Γ such that ∆ ⊆ Γ. Now let f be a constant function from D to 0, and g be defined in the exactly same fashion as in proposition 2. According to definition 1, s = 〈Γ, f , g〉 ∈ S c , so by truth lemma, for any φ ∈ ∆, c , s φ and thus ∆ is satisfiable. Then strong completeness follows.
Complexity
In this section, we will give a PSPACE algorithm in light of tableau method for the satisfiability problem of LKv r . Since LKv r contains K, the lower bound is also PSPACE. So we can conclude that the decision problem of LKv r is PSPACE-complete.
Rules of tableau Definition 7.
A propositional tableau is a set of formula X satisfying the following:
• if φ ∧ ψ ∈ T then φ ∈ T and ψ ∈ T ,
• if φ ∈ T then ¬φ ∈ T and vice versa, We call a violation of the last clause "blatantly inconsistent". X is fully expanded if and only if for any φ ∈ X and ψ a subformula of φ, either ψ or ¬ψ is in X .

Definition 8. A state is a tuple 〈X , g, h, ha, hb〉 satisfying:
• X is a fully expanded propositional tableau.
• Let E X = {〈i, d〉 | for some φ,
g is a function defined on set E X . g(i, d) is a 2-tuple 〈A, B〉 such that:
-B is a partition of B, always including empty set;
In the sequel let g(i, d)[1] denote such A and g(i, d)[2] for such B.
• h is a function defined on set {〈i, φ〉
• ha, hb are both function defined on set {〈i, φ, d〉
or both of them are .
As we did in the proof of completeness, these functions g, h, ha, hb are also "extra information". The function g here is actually a enumeration of all possible equivalence relation ∼ i,d given in the proof of proposition 2.
It is worthwhile here to briefly discuss the number of possible g, h, ha, hb for a given X . Obvi- Now we present the method of deciding the satisfiability of a LKv r formula φ 0 trough building a tree. In the following rules, L means the formula set of a node, F represents the additional information needed (g, h, ha, hb), and C is a partial function from D(φ 0 ) to represents the required assignments of value names occurred in φ 0 . Since the set of all finite subsets of a countable set is also countable, there is a function, say, cod e(X ) to code each finite set of formulas into a unique positive integer.
Construct a tree with a single node s 0 as its root, and let L(s
2. Repeatedly try each of following rules in their order until none of them applies:
(a) Forming propositional tableau: if s is a leaf node, L(s) is not blatantly inconsistent and not a propositional tableau, then there must be a ψ ∈ L(s) such that following 3 rules applies:
i. if ψ = ¬¬χ, add a new node s ′ and an edge between s and s ′ to the tree(i.e. a successor of s), and set
ii. if ψ = ¬(χ 1 ∧χ 2 ), add two successor s 1 , s 2 of s, and set
(b) Forming fully expanded propositional tableau: if s is a leaf node, L(s) is a propositional tableau but not a fully expanded propositional tableau, then there must be φ ∈ Sub(L(s)) such that φ and ¬φ are both not in L(S). In this case add two successor s 1 , s 2 of s and set 
• For each φ such that 
(e) Mark satisfiable: if s is not yet marked, non of the above three rules applies, and all its successors(possibly none) have been marked, then:
• if the edges to the successors of s are not labeled, then mark s as "satisfiable" if any one of its successors is marked "satisfiable", otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
• if the edges to the successors of s are labeled, then mark s as "satisfiable" if all of its successors are marked "satisfiable", otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
• if s has no successors, then mark s as "satisfiable" if L(s) is not blatantly inconsistent, otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
3. if root s 0 is marked "satisfiable" then return φ 0 is satisfiable, otherwise φ 0 is unsatisfiable.
Lemma 9.
For any LKv r formula φ 0 , the tree construction method defined above terminates.
Proof. It is immediate to see that if s ′ is a successor of s generated by rule (1) 
rule (1) (2) and (3) are no longer applicable to s ′ . This means the longest chain of unlabeled edges will not exceed 2 × |φ 0 | + 1 otherwise there must be a blatant inconsistency. At the same time, if s ′ is generated from s by rule (
epth(L(s)). Thus in any branch
the number of labeled edges will not exceed |φ 0 |. So we can conclude that the depth of the tree is bounded by 2 * |φ 0 | 2 . On the other hand, the branching number for any node is also bounded by |φ 0 | |φ 0 | 2 +3×|φ 0 | . So this construction must terminate.
After proving that this tableau must halt, the correctness of this tableau must be argued for now. Correctness means that, root s 0 is marked "satisfiable" if and only if φ 0 is satisfiable. The following two lemmas present two directions of correctness respectively.
Lemma 10.
For any LKv r formula φ 0 , if after the tree construction defined above, root s 0 is marked "satisfiable", then φ 0 is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose the root is marked "satisfiable". Then we can build a model satisfying φ 0 from the constructed tree. Let
• W = {s | s is marked "satisfiable" and 〈L(s), F(s)〉 is a state};
• O = all finite subset of LKv r plus • and •;
• s→ i t if and only if there exists s ′ ∈ W such that s ′ is an i-successor of s and t is reachable from s through a sequence of unlabeled edges;
By our construction method, there must be such a model. Now we can prove that if φ ∈ L(s) then , s φ by a induction on Sub + (φ 0 ). We give the key step of that induction: [2] . Consider following two cases: [2] , then there is a unique X ∈ g s (i, d) [2] such that φ ∈ X . Now for any t such that s→ i t, by the property of → i , there exists s ′ such that s ′ is an isuccessor of s and t is reachable from s ′ through a sequence of unlabeled edges. By rule (d), s ′ must be generated by a formula of the form
we suppose it is generated by
because s ′ must be marked "satisfiable" and thus is not blatantly inconsistent. Again 
• 
Since s is marked "satisfiable", s a and s b must also be so. By rule (e) and the finiteness of this tree, there must be t a , t b in W and reachable through a sequence of unlabeled edges from s a and s b respectively. Then φ ∈ L(t a ) and φ ∈ L(t b ) and
By induction hypothesis and 's properties,
Since the root is marked "satisfiable", there must be a s reachable through unlabeled edges from s 0 such that s ∈ W . Then φ 0 ∈ L(s) and then , s φ 0 , so φ 0 is satisfiable. If s is not a leaf and rule (c) was applied to s: 
. This ∼ relation is evidently a equivalence relation. Let f (i, d, x) be the unique set X ∈ g(i, d) [2] such that there exists ψ ∈ X and t ∈ W such that , t ψ and
Then, let h be a function on {〈i, ψ〉 | ¬ i ψ ∈ L(s)}. By supposition, , s ¬ i ψ for any i, ψ in the domain of h. This means there exists t ∈ W such that s→ i t and , t ψ. Now let h 
To see this more clearly, suppose s ′′ is generated by ha(i, ψ, d 0 ) and let t = ha
, then by rule (d), there are several cases:
• α ∈ L(s)\ i . Since s→ i t, this is also evident; [1] . By definition of g(i, d) [1] , every i-accessible world from s refutes every formula in g(i, d) [1] . So , t α.
• for some d ∈ E L(s) (i), α ∈ ¬ g(i, d) [2] It is straightforward to turn the above construction method into an algorithm running in polynomial space, using a depth-first search. For stepping down in the search tree, we need to record where we are currently by a stack where in every level a set of subformulas of φ 0 is kept and the height of this stack is at most |φ 0 | 2 . Thus we need (|φ 0 | 2 × |φ 0 |) space. As the width of this tableau is exceedingly large, extra space is needed for branching. We need to enumerate all possible F properly. At each level of the stack, we need to record where we are when enumerating F so that the next F can be calculated. This consumes (|φ 0 | 2 × |φ 0 | 2 ) space. This means this algorithm runs in (|φ 0 | 4 ) space, that is, in PSPACE. Since this logic also contains modal logic K, its satisfiability problem is PSPACE-hard. So we have theorem:
Theorem 12. The satisfiability problem for logic LKv r is PSPACE-complete.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that r is sound and complete w.r.t. LKv r over arbitrary models and gave a tableau for this logic. This is just a start of the study of the complexity of similar "knowing what" logics.
Our proof of the completeness is relatively simpler than its counterpart in [11] . Exactly what makes this possible needs further investigation, and we conjecture that, if this cause can be found, we may give a beautiful frame of completeness proof upon which proving completeness results on other special model classes will be easier.
Our tableau is not simple, and more importantly, unlike tableaux for normal modal logics where if a formula is unsatisfiable, a proof of its negation can be effectively constructed, our tableau for LKv r cannot provide this proof now. This commands further study, but our conjecture here is that, a proof of the negation of an unsatisfiable formula is attainable from this tableau or a slightly tweaked version, even though it is not found yet.
The complexity of ELKv r is what attracted us initially, and our tableau may shed some light on
it. Yet it is still arguable whether it is in PSPACE. To make things more explicit, we should try adding formulas d = x and i (φ → d = x) directly into the tableau instead of using G i (φ, d) and partitions, which may only work on model class K.
Last but not least, we should consider extending our language to incorporate more first-order characteristics, such as predicate or equality. If such extension does not bring too much complexity or other undesirable property, we may also try to give a good logic on encryption, as Cohen and Dam did in [1] .
